THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO



# Static Detection and Automatic Exploitation of Intent Message Vulnerabilities in Android Applications

Daniele Gallingani, **Rigel Gjomemo**, V.N. Venkatakrishnan, Stefano Zanero

#### Android Message Passing Mechanism

Android apps are composed of different components

*Intents* carry messages among components and applications

Components declare the types of intents they are willing to receive

Intents can be sent explicitly or implicitly



#### Motivation

**Problem**: Android Components have no message origin verification capabilities

An attacker can spoof legitimate intents and send malicious input



#### Questions

- Could we check if applications validate input?

- If so, can we automatically generate exploit opportunities?

# Contributions

- Static analysis method to automatically detect data flows leading to sensitive operations

   Formulation of the problem as an IFDS problem
- Method for automatically generating exploits that trigger malicious behavior
- Results
  - Automatically generated exploits for 26 applications and showed they are vulnerable to user interface spoofing attacks

# Outline

- Problem Statement
- Approach
- Implementation
- Results

```
String host = intent.getStringExtra("hostname");
String file = intent.getStringExtra("filename");
String url="http://www.example.com";
if (host.contains("example.com"))
    url = "http://" + host + "/";
if (file.contains(".."))
   file = file.replace("..", "");
String httpPar = toBase64(file);
 . . .
DefaultHttpClient httpC = new DefaultHttpClient();
HttpGet get = new HttpGet(url+httpPar);
. . .
```

httpC.execute(get);

```
String host = intent.getStringExtra("hostname");
String file = intent.getStringExtra("filename");
String url="http://www.example.com";
if (host.contains("example.com"))
    url = "http://" + host + "/";
if (file.contains(".."))
   file = file.replace("..", "");
String httpPar = toBase64(file);
 . . .
DefaultHttpClient httpC = new DefaultHttpClient();
HttpGet get = new HttpGet(url+httpPar);
. . .
httpC.execute(get);
```

Source

```
String host = intent.getStringExtra("hostname");
String file = intent.getStringExtra("filename");
String url="http://www.example.com";
if (host.contains("example.com"))
   url = "http://" + host + "/";
if (file.contains(".."))
   file = file.replace("..", "");
String httpPar = toBase64(file);
 . . .
DefaultHttpClient httpC = new DefaultHttpClient();
                                                        Sink
HttpGet get = new HttpGet(url+httpPar);
```

. . .

httpC.execute(get);

Source

String host = intent.getStringExtra("hostname");
String file = intent.getStringExtra("filename");

Source

- Finding paths from sources to sinks is not sufficient
- Question: Are those paths feasible for an attack?

HttpGet get = new HttpGet(url+httpPar);

Sink

httpC.execute(get);

# Approach

- Input state: V<sub>1</sub>
- Exploit state(s): V<sub>e</sub>
  Value patterns related to sinks
  Find relationship F between V<sub>1</sub> and V<sub>e</sub>, such that V<sub>i</sub>=F(V<sub>e</sub>)



- Path Computation
  - Find all paths from sources to sinks



• Path Computation

- Find all paths from sources to sinks

• Symbolic Execution

– Generate a symbolic formula F<sub>p</sub>



• Path Computation

Find all paths from sources to sinks

Symbolic Execution

– Generate a symbolic formula F<sub>p</sub>

Exploit generation

#### – Solve $F_p \wedge V_e \mathop{\rightarrow} V_I$



#### Path Computation



- Supergraph contains CFGs of all the functions
- Taint Propagation
  - Identifies statements that can be influenced by attacker
  - Reduces size of the problem

# Implementation (Background)

- Path Computation: IFDS framework (Soot&Heros)
  - Transforms dataflow problems into graph reachability problems
  - Framework user defines a fact
  - Framework user defines update rules for a fact
- Exploit Generation: Kaluza
  - Efficient string solver
  - Native support for many string operations

## Implementation

- Path Computation
  - A fact contains path and taint information for every node
  - Different rules update the fact information during graph traversal

#### • Exploit Generation

- Translate  $F_p \wedge V_e$  into a Kaluza formula
- Additional string operations modeled using the Kaluza language

E.g.,: a.contains("test")  $\rightarrow$  a \in CapturedBrack(/.\*test.\*/);

### **Results Overview**

- 64 applications of different sizes
  - 26 exploits generated and manually verified
- Sink statements: GUI operations
- V<sub>e</sub> chosen to change apps GUIs (phishing)
- Different GUI targets
  - Entire screen change
  - Alerts screen change
  - User input fields
  - Other Components

# Results

	Арр	Attack	]		
Entire Screen	Mint	Display an arbitrary web page inside an Activity	ا ۲:1 کا کے 😵 کا		
	GoSMS	Prompt to the user notification about a new message with arbitrary sender and SMS content	You need to verify your credit card information Credit card number		
User Input	GoSMS	Prompt notification about a new message received with arbitrary sender and receiver	xxxx-xxxx-xxxxx		
	Yelp	Modify venue review draft screen and enter review on behalf of the user	Verification code		
Alert Screen	Poste Pay	Modify and show the application prompt alerts with arbitrary messages	? Help with verification code		
Other Components	Craigslist	Change the Action Bar title, compromising the interface integrity			

# Results

	Min	Max	Avg
Per-application execution time	2.4 min	33.2 min	12.3 min
Per-application components	3	31	24.5
Per-application vulnerable paths	2	19	4.2
Per-path statements	5	81	17.2
Per-path it-statements	U	3	0.98

- Very few validation checks present
  - Mostly null pointers
- 31% of the String library functions approximated with Kaluza

### Limitations

 Untainted variables contribute to application state. May introduce false positives

Solver approximations. May introduce false positives

## Conclusions

- Conclusions
  - We present an automatic method to discuver vulnerable paths inside Android application components
  - Our method is modelled as an IFDS problem
  - We provide proofs for the vulnerabilities under the form of actual exploits, generated automatically.

#### Questions?